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Quantization, a commonly used technique to reduce the memory foot-
print of a neural network for edge computing, entails reducing the pre-
cision of the floating-point representation used for the parameters of
the network. The impact of such rounding-off errors on the overall per-
formance of the neural network is estimated using testing, which is not
exhaustive and thus cannot be used to guarantee the safety of the model.
We present a framework based on Satisfiability Modulo Theory (SMT)
solvers to quantify the robustness of neural networks to parameter per-
turbation. To this end, we introduce notions of local and global robust-
ness that capture the deviation in the confidence of class assignments
due to parameter quantization. The robustness notions are then cast as
instances of SMT problems and solved automatically using solvers, such
as dReal. We demonstrate our framework on two simple Multi-Layer Per-
ceptrons (MLP) that perform binary classification on a two-dimensional
input. In addition to quantifying the robustness, we also show that Rec-
tified Linear Unit activation results in higher robustness than linear ac-
tivations for our MLPs.
1 Introduction
Neural networks entail interconnected computational nodes that transform
weighted combinations of their inputs using nonlinear functions. The intercon-
nections lead to compositional behavior at the network-level, which enables neu-
ral networks to approximate highly nonlinear functions as their responses. The
advent of the Backpropagation algorithm [9], the availability of large datasets [19],
and optimized hardware [30] has led to widespread success in supervised and un-
supervised learning.
Supervised learning of a neural network is the process of optimizing the
network’s parameters using reference data. Supervised learning can be used to
i) learn classifiers, which can label an input into one of finitely many classes
and ii) learn the more general class of regressors, which capture relationships
across continuous domains. Learning a model, also known as training, involves
?? Research was performed with other authors at Texas Tech University.
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Fig. 1. Robustness analysis of neural network enables safe parameter quantization.
formulating a loss function that quantifies the performance of the model as a
function of the parameters, and then minimizing the function using numerical
techniques over the reference data, also known as training data. Backpropagation
is the most popular class of numerical techniques used to optimize the parameters
of the modern neural networks. Unsupervised learning, on the other hand, entails
learning patterns and underlying distributions in unlabelled data.
Large networks contain millions of parameters and are trained using Graph-
ics Processing Units (GPUs). Deploying trained neural networks in real-world
production systems entails fetching the input from the user/client-device and
then passing it through the neural network, also known as the forward pass, and
obtaining the output, which could be a class-label or a regressed value, in real
time. Web services, which perform the forward pass on the cloud can utilize the
power of GPUs for time-sensitive calculations. The downside is that such appli-
cations suffer from i) the latency of sending the input to the remote server and
waiting for the output of the neural network and ii) privacy concerns of exposing
potentially sensitive inputs on the network.
An alternative design involves performing the forward pass on the client de-
vice (edge) by running the neural networks on it. This eliminates the network
latencies and also avoids exposing the user’s inputs to the network. Running
neural networks on edge devices, such as mobile phones, tablets and low-power
devices like wearables and Raspberry Pis present unique challenges. Storing the
millions of parameters in floating-point representations incurs significant mem-
ory costs and the computational power needed for the forward pass may be pro-
hobitive. Executing complex neural networks on the low computational power
and memory available on edge devices is a well-known challenge in the industry
and thus is an active area of interest.
In addition to dedicated hardware for low-power devices, the community has
evolved three main approaches to the problem of running neural networks on
resource-constrained edge devices.
1. Quantization of Parameters: The precision of the floating-point representa-
tion used to store the network parameters is reduced to lower the memory
footprint of storing the network in the memory [14].
2. Pruning : The edges, represented by the weights, between nodes that do not
significantly influence the network’s output are made 0 and thus removed
from the network, resulting in a reduction in the memory footprint [25].
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3. Optimized Neural-Network Architectures: The network architecture is de-
signed to reduce the floating-point operations, thereby reducing the running
time of the forward pass, see [11] for an example.
These techniques have emerged using empirical benchmarking and have found
limited success in the community. Today, there are a handful of applications that
deploy neural networks on edge devices. The main reason behind this lack of
widespread success is the unpredictability of the aforementioned techniques in
preserving the performance of the network after training. Specifically, the state
of the art on estimating the impact of pruning and quantization on the network’s
accuracy is limited to testing on a finite number of test cases.
In this paper, we introduce a framework to quantify the robustness of neural
networks to parameter quantization, thereby automating the process of bounding
the change in performance of the neural network. We introduce notions of lo-
cal and global robustness of networks to parameter changes. Given a bounded
perturbation in the parameter vector, local robustness measures the maximal
change in the confidence of class assignment for an input. Global robustness ex-
tends this notion to the entire input-space. We cast these notions into instances
of SMT problems and solve them automatically using solvers, such as dReal [31].
See Fig. 1 for an overview.
Robustness of neural networks has been an active area of research, but most of
the authors have focused on input perturbations, rather than parameter changes.
Our framework is focused on parameter perturbations. In summary, the main
contributions of our paper are as follows.
– An automated framework is presented for bounding the deviation in the per-
formance of neural networks due to parameter quantization. The framework
enables the implementation of deep-learning-based applications on edge de-
vices, like mobile phones, tablets and other embedded environments.
– We present two use-cases to demonstrate our framework: the parameters of
two small MLPs that perform binary classification are perturbed and the
robustness is analyzed using our approach.
– In addition to estimating parameter robustness, we also show that ReLU
activations are more robust than linear activations for our MLPs.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents background
on neural networks and SMT solvers. Section 3 introduces the theory of lo-
cal and global robustness to parameter perturbations and Section 4 details the
corresponding SMT problem formulations. Section 5 presents the case studies
and their corresponding trained neural networks. Section 6 presents robustness
analysis on the neural networks. Section 7 reviews related work and Section 8
presents our conclusions and the directions for future work.
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2 Background
Fig. 2. Weighted averaging, followed by
nonlinear activation.
Every node of an NN performs two op-
erations: weighted averaging of the in-
puts, and a nonlinear transformation
of the weighted sum using a so-called
activation function, see Fig. 2. Some
of the commonly used activation func-
tions are depicted in Fig. 3.
A neural network is formed by in-
terconnecting several such nodes us-
ing different architectures. Each connection from node i to node j is character-
ized by the weight that is used for the output of node i for the weighted average
performed at node j. Typical architectures consists of layers of nodes connected
to the nodes of the subsequent layer. The output of the neural network is vector
with each entry representing the output of the corresponding node in the final
layer. It is common to construct the network to have k output nodes if the goal
is to assign one (or more) of k possible class assignments. Moreover, all the k
values lie in [0, 1] and sum to 1. The input is assigned the class label 0 ≤ l ≤ k−1
if the value of the lth node is the highest among the k outputs.
Fig. 3. Commonly used activation functions in neural networks.
We introduce notations for the parameter vector of a neural network as fol-
lows. NNp denotes an instance of the neural network with p being the vector of
parameter assignments. Given an input x, and the instance if the neural network
NNp, the vector of k outputs is returned by the function fNNp(x). NNp(x) is
the index of the highest output and thus corresponds to the class label l assigned
to the input.
The dReal Solver
The dReal [13] tool is an SMT solver [10] for nonlinear theories over the reals.The
tool can handle first order formula defined by nonlinear real functions such as
polynomials, trigonometric functions, exponential functions, etc. It implements
the framework of δ-complete decision procedure [12], which has two possible
outputs:
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– unsat: no variable assignment satisfying the formula.
– δ-sat: exists a variable assignment ξ satisfying the formula if we consider a
user-specified numerical perturbation δ ∈ Q+.
We note that the satisfiability of first-order formula over the real is undecid-
able [5]. The tool is implemented in the framework of delta-complete analysis,
which provides an algorithm for the originally undecidable problem by using
approximation (the use of δ in the analysis).
The latest version of dReal [21] now implements Optimization Modulo The-
ory (OMT) [29,7]. OMT is an extension of SMT which allows for finding models
that optimize given objectives.
3 Parameter Robustness
In this section, we present various definitions of parameter robustness analysis
for neural networks.
We begin with a definition of parameter robustness locally to an input similar
to local input robustness as presented in [15,32,6].
Definition 1. An NN with parameter vector p0 is (δ, ε)-parameter robust locally
at an input x0 if and only if:
∀p.|p− p0| ≤ δ =⇒ |fNNp0 (x)− fNNp(x)| ≤ ε (1)
Definition 1 gives a quantitative measure on the change in confidence of
labeling a certain input. This definition, however, does not cover all inputs in
the input domain. The following definition address this:
Definition 2. An NN with parameter vector p0 is (δ, ε)-parameter robust glob-
ally for a input domain D if and only if:
∀x ∈ D,∀p.|p− p0| ≤ δ =⇒ |fNNp0 (x)− fNNp(x)| ≤ ε (2)
Though the definitions of parameter robustness described above give a quan-
titative measure on the change of confidence, it does not say whether the decision
label will actually be changed. For example, if the confidence value changes pos-
itively for a given label, the decision label will remain the same, even though ε
could be higher. As a result, the above robustness measures gives only an idea on
relative change in confidence value, but not how the actual label will be changed.
Now, we define the parameter robustness that specifies whether an actual
label of an input changes. Both local and global versions are defined as follows:
Definition 3. An NN with parameter vector p0 is locally δ-parameter robust
locally at an input x0 if and only if:
∀p.|p− p0| ≤ δ =⇒ NNp0(x0) = NNp(x0) (3)
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Definition 4. An NN with parameter vector p0 is locally δ-parameter robust
globally for an input domain D if and only if:
∀x ∈ D,∀p.|p− p0| ≤ δ =⇒ NNp0(x) = NNp(x) (4)
Definition 4 states that for an NN to be δ-parameter robust globally for all
input in the domain, no input cannot be mislabeled. This is rather a very strict
definition of robustness. In particular, when a quantization technique is applied
to NN, it is expected that the labels for some inputs will be changed, at least the
inputs close to the decision boundary. To incorporate this, we slightly modify
the definition 4 as follows:
Definition 5. An NN with parameter vector p0 is locally δσ-parameter robust
globally for an input domain D if and only if:
∀x ∈ D,∀p.|p− p0| ∧ |fNNp0 (x)− l| ≥ σ ≤ δ =⇒ NNp0(x) = NNp(x) (5)
where l denotes the level set of the confidence function, which is used to label the
input, i.e, fNNp0 (x) = l represents a decision boundary.
The δσ-parameter robustness of NN is illustrated in 4. The red line represents
the decision boundary and ‘-’ and ‘+’ represent the decision labels. The yellow
lines are σ distance away from the decision boundary. Definition 5 states that
all the inputs that are σ or more distance away from the decision boundary
(i.e., all the points either above the top yellow line or below the bottom yellow
line) will be labeled as same in both NNp0 and NNp. The inputs between the
yellow lines, however, may be be mislabeled, as illustrated by the points inside
the yellow circles in the figure.
Fig. 4. Illustration of δσ-parameter robustness on a two-class classifier.
4 Verification and Estimation of Parameter Robustness
In this section we will present how to verify and estimate parameter robustness
using SMT solver.
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4.1 Verifying Parameter Robustness
We apply SMT solver to verify all the parameter robustness defined in Section 3.
The key idea is to construct a formula for each of them by the negating their
definition. The robustness property will then be verified if the SMT solver returns
unsat. The formula for all the parameter robustness given to SMT solver are as
follows:
– To verify Eq. 1, we use the following formula:
∃p.(p ≥ p0 − δ) ∧ (p ≤ p0 + δ) ∧ abs(fNNp0 (x0)− fNNp(x0)) > ε (6)
– To verify Eq. 2, we use the following formula:
∃p, x, (p ≥ p0 − δ) ∧ (p ≤ p0 + δ) ∧ (x ≥ x) ∧ (x ≤ x¯) ∧ abs(fNNp0 (x0)−
fNNp(x0)) > ε
(7)
where we define the input domain D as a bounding box, i.e., D = [x, x¯]
– To verify Eq. 3, we use the following formula:
∃p.(p ≥ p0 − δ) ∧ (p ≤ p0 + δ) ∧ ((fNNp0 (x0) ≤ l) ∧ (fNNp(x0) > l)∨
(fNNp0 (x0) < l) ∧ (fNNp(x0) ≥ l))
(8)
Here we encode NNp0(x0) = NNp(x0) as follows:
((fNNp0 (x0) ≤ l) ∧ (fNNp(x0) ≤ l)) ∨ ((fNNp0 (x0) > l) ∧ (fNNp(x0) > l))
That is x0 falls in the same side of the decision boundary both in NNp0 and
NNp. For the verification purpose, we consider its negation.
– To verify Eq. 4, we use the following formula:
∃p, x.(p ≥ p0 − δ) ∧ (p ≤ p0 + δ) ∧ (x ≥ x) ∧ (x ≤ x¯) ∧ ((fNNp0 (x0) ≤ l)
∧ (fNNp(x0) > l) ∨ (fNNp0 (x0) < l) ∧ (fNNp(x0) ≥ l))
(9)
– To verify Eq. 5, we use the following formula:
∃p, x.(p ≥ p0 − δ) ∧ (p ≤ p0 + δ) ∧ (x ≥ x) ∧ (x ≤ x¯) ∧ (abs(fNNp0 (x)− l) ≥ σ)
∧ ((fNNp0 (x0) ≤ l) ∧ (fNNp(x0) > l)) ∨ ((fNNp0 (x0) < l) ∧ (fNNp(x0) ≥ l))
(10)
We verify all the robustness properties on dReal solver [21].
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4.2 Estimating Maximum Parameter Robustness
For (δ, ε)-parameter robustness, we allow δ-perturbation on the parameter space
and check whether the confidence value is bounded by ε. The estimation problem
is defined as computing maximum possible value of ε for a given value of δ. We
are interested in this estimation problem, as the maximum value of ε represents
the least robustness measure for a given δ value. The estimation problem can be
formulated as an optimization problem as follows:
– ε-Estimation for (δ, )-parameter robustness locally at x0:
minimize
ε∈[0,ε¯]
− ε
subject to:
(p ≥ p0 − δ)
(p ≤ p0 + δ)
abs(fNNp0 (x0)− fNNp(x0)) = ε
(11)
where, ε¯ is the maximum value of ε. Note that, instead of maximizing, ε,
we minimize its negation, as the SMT solver we used implements only the
minimization problem.
– ε-Estimation for (δ, )-parameter robustness globally for D = [x, x¯]:
minimize
ε∈[0,ε¯]
− ε
subject to:
(p ≥ p0 − δ)
(p ≤ p0 + δ)
(x ≥ x)
(x ≤ x¯)
abs(fNNp0 (x0)− fNNp(x0)) = ε
(12)
Similarly, for δσ-parameter robustness, we consider estimation problem for σ.
For a given value δ, we want to maximize σ, which tells us how far away the
boundary needs to be shifted so that no input beyond it cannot be mislabeled.
We formulate this estimation problem as follows:
minimize
σ∈[0,σ¯]
− σ
subject to
(p ≥ p0 − δ)
(p ≤ p0 + δ)
(x ≥ x)
(x ≤ x¯)
abs(fNNp0 (x)− l)) = σ
(fNNp0 (x) ≤ l) ∧ ((fNNp(x) ≤ l)) ∨ ((fNNp0 (x) > l) ∧ (fNNp(x) > l))
(13)
where maximum value of σ¯ is the maximum value of σ.
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5 Case Studies
We describe two datasets and the corresponding neural networks as case studies
for our robustness analysis framework.
(a) ReLU activation. (b) Linear activation.
Fig. 5. Two MLPs trained on the Athletes dataset.
The first dataset, known as cats, contains the height, weight, and gender of
144 domesticated cats (47 female and 97 male) [2]. The gender identification
problem entails learning a classifier to estimate if a cat is Male or Female based
on its height and weight. We present a simple one-node model that implements
logistic regression and examine its robustness.
Given the height (H) and the weight (W ) of a cat, the classifier, learned using
Python Scikit-Learn 0.20.3, is given by y = sig(x), where x = c0 + c1H + c2W .
We assign the class label “Male” if the y ≥ 0.5 and “Female” otherwise. The
parameters of the model that were learned on 78% of the data were c0 =
−3.51518067, c1 = 0.07577862, and c2 = 1.18118408. The multinomial loss func-
tion was optimized using the lbgfs algorithm [28]. The testing accuracy on the
remaining 22% was 87.5%.
A second dataset contains the official statistics on the 11, 538 athletes (6,333
men and 5,205) men that participated in the 2016 Olympic games at Rio de
Janeiro [1]. Each row contains an id, the name, nationality, gender, date birth,
height, weight, sport of the athletes and the medals tally. The gender identifica-
tion problem entails learning an MLP to guess the gender of the athlete based
on their height and weight. We present two MLPs for this problem and examine
their robustness in the next section.
Given the height and weight of an athlete as the input, the MLPs is con-
structed using two layers: a hidden layer and an output node. Three nodes that
make up the hidden layer perform weighted averaging of the inputs and trans-
form them using a nonlinear activation. Their outputs are then fed to the output
node, which again takes a weighted average and uses the Sigmoid activation to
obtain a number between 0 and 1. If the output is greater than 0.5, the input is
assigned “Male”, otherwise it is assigned “Female”. We implemented two varia-
tions of the model. We used ReLU and linear activations in the three nodes of
the hidden layer. The two models and their parameters are illustrated in Fig. 5.
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The models were implemented in Keras and trained on a GPU-based instance
of Amazon Web Services. The training accuracy was 77.19% and 77.36% for the
ReLU and Linear versions respectively after 200 epochs.
In the next section, we apply our robustness analysis framework to examine
the effect of quantizing the parameters of the logistic regression model for the
Cats dataset and the two MLPs for the athletes dataset.
6 Results
In this section we discuss our results. For all three NNs (one for first case study
and two for second case study), we present results for (δ, ε)- and δσ-parameter
robustness both locally at an input and globally at input domain.
δ
ε
CAT ATH-ReLU ATH-Linear
0.005 0.00691 0.166 0.545
0.01 0.05054 0.0825 0.219
δ
σ
CAT ATH-ReLU ATH-Linear
0.005 (0.024, 0.021) (0.082, 0.076) (0.268, 0.218)
0.01 (0.052, 0.04) (0.165, 0.144) (0.44, 0.34)
Table 1. Estimated values for ε and σ for (δ, ε)- and δσ-parameter robustness, respec-
tively, globally for input domains
Table 1 shows the estimated value of ε of (δ, ε)-parameter robustness, com-
puted using Eq. (12), and σ of δσ-parameter robustness, computed using Eq. (13),
for entire input domains. We compute them for two different δ values. The col-
umn CAT, ATH-ReLU and ATH-Linear represent the results for cat classifier,
athletic classifier with ReLU activation and athletic classifier with Linear acti-
vation, respectively. The tuple in the table for σ represents values for male and
female class, repectively. If we compare the results of ATH-ReLU and ATH-
Linear, it is clear that the former classifier is much more robust than the latter
for δ pertubation of the parameter values.
Fig. 6 illustrates parameter robustness of the Cat classifier presented. For
(δ, ε)-parameter robustness, we choose two different δ values (0.005 and 0.01).
For both cases, we randomly chose 1000 points from the input domain. We
then computed ε for all inputs using Eq. (11). Fig. 6(a,b) show (δ, ε)-parameter
robustness locally at each randomly selected points. The blue line represents
the decision boundary of NN, whereas the colorbar represents the range of ε.
It is clear from the figures that ε value is higher in the bottom right region,
which means the region is more susceptible to be mislabeled in the perturbed
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(a) (δ, ε)-parameter robustness for δ = 0.005 (b) (δ, ε)-parameter robustness for δ = 0.01
(c) δσ-parameter robustness for δ = 0.005 (d) δσ-parameter robustness for δ = 0.01
Fig. 6. Parameter robustness analysis of Cat classifier.
network. Note that does not mean that the input would actually be mislabeled
(see explanation in Section 3).
Fig. 6(c,d) illustrate both δ- and δσ-parameter robustness for two differ-
ent δ values. For δ-parameter robustness, we selected 1000 random inputs from
the domain. We then checked whether the input labeled will be flipped in the
perturbed network using Eq. (8). In the figures, green and red points represent
non-flippable and flippable inputs, respectively. The top (bottom) red line is gen-
erated by adding (subtracting) σ to the decision boundary, where σ is computed
using Eq. (13).
Figs. 7 and 8 illustrate the parameter robustness analysis of the athletics
classifier with ReLU and Linear activation, respectively. Comparing these figures,
we can conclude that the athletics classifier with ReLU activation is much more
robust as compared to the classifier with linear activation.
7 Related Work
Robustness analysis of neural networks is an active area of research. In this
section, we compare and contrast some of the recent papers with our framework.
Robustness typically refers to an NN’s ability to handle perturbations in the
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(a) (δ, ε)-parameter robustness for δ = 0.005 (b) (δ, ε)-parameter robustness for δ = 0.01
(c) δσ-parameter robustness for δ = 0.005 (d) δσ-parameter robustness for δ = 0.01
Fig. 7. Parameter robustness analysis of Athletics classifier with ReLU activation.
input data. The efforts to characterize robustness can be broadly classified into
two types: model-centric approaches and data-centric approaches.
Model-centric approaches focus on improving the problem formulation to
construct robust networks. Distillation training, one of the earliest attempts, en-
tails training one model to predict the output probabilities of another model that
was trained on an earlier, baseline standard to emphasize accuracy [16,27]. In
[26], the authors proposed a new set of attacks for the L0, L2, and L∞ distance
metrics to construct upper bounds on the robustness of neural networks and
thereby demonstrate that defensive distillation is limited in handling adversarial
examples. Adversarial perturbations, random noise, and geometric transforma-
tions were studied in [4] and the authors highlight close connections between
the robustness to additive perturbations and geometric properties of the clas-
sifiers decision boundary, such as the curvature. Spatial Transform Networks,
which entail geometrical transformation of the a network’s filter maps were pro-
posed in [18] to improve the robustness to geometric perturbations. Recently, a
generic analysis framework CROWN was proposed to certify NNs using linear or
quadratic upper and lower bounds for general activation functions [17]. The au-
thors extended their work to overcome the limitation of simple fully-connected
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(a) (δ, ε)-parameter robustness for δ = 0.005 (b) (δ, ε)-parameter robustness for δ = 0.01
(c) δσ-parameter robustness for δ = 0.005 (d) δσ-parameter robustness for δ = 0.01
Fig. 8. Parameter robustness analysis of Athletes classifier with linear activation.
layers and ReLU activations to propose CNN-Cert. The new framework can
handle various architectures including convolutional layers, max-pooling layers,
batch normalization layer, residual blocks, as well as general activation functions
and capable of certifying robustness on general convolutional neural networks [3].
Data-centric approaches entail identifying and rejecting perturbed samples,
or increasing the training data to handle perturbations appropriately. Binary de-
tector networks that can spot adversarial samples [24,22], and augmenting data
to reflect different lighting conditions [20] are typical examples. Additionally,
robust optimization using saddle point(min-max) formulation [23] and region-
based classification by assembling information in a hypercube centered [8] have
also shown promising results. The above-mentioned approaches focus on per-
turbations to data, but our framework focuses on perturbations to the parame-
ters with the end goal of safely implementing the neural networks on resource-
constrined platforms.
8 Conclusions and Directions for Future Work
We presented a framework to automatically estimate the impact of rounding-off
errors in the parameters of a neural network. The framework uses SMT solvers
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to estimate the local and global robustness of a given network. We applied our
framework on a single-node logistic regression model and two small MLPs. We
will consider convolutional neural networks in the future and investigate the
scalability of our framework to larger parameter vectors. Compositionality will
be critical to analyzing real-world neural networks and we will explore extending
the theory of approximate bisimulation and the related Lyapunov-like functions
to our problem.
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